

Expectations and the empirical fit of DSGE models

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Abstract

This paper studies the improvement in empirical fit of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that assume adaptive learning in lieu of rational expectations (RE). The literature finds that estimated DSGE models with adaptive learning generate near universal improvements in fit, while inference on structural parameters is mostly unchanged. Improvements are attributed to the increased persistence generated by backward-looking expectations. We show, however, that improvements often result from altered cross-equation restrictions and not additional persistence assumptions. Nested comparisons of Euler-equation and infinite-horizon adaptive learning both significantly improve upon RE but only the latter's improvements are due to expectation formation. Bounded rationality assumptions offer an intuitive way to improve both in-sample and out-of-sample DSGE model fit. But our results suggest that learning models best-capture persistent deviation in beliefs from fundamentals rather than temporary deviations at business cycle frequencies.

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1 Introduction

Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models often struggle to reproduce the persistence observed in actual macroeconomic data. This has led many researchers to

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consider additional frictions, preference assumptions, or ad hoc adjustments within the standard rational expectations (RE) framework to increase persistence.¹ However, since evidence from forecasting surveys (see [Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015](#)) and laboratory experiments (see [Hommes 2013](#)) often suggest deviations from rationality, many researchers have sought to generate this persistence directly through expectations by deviating from RE. For example, [Milani \(2006, 2007\)](#), [Eusepi and Preston \(2011\)](#), [Del Negro and Eusepi \(2011\)](#), [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012a,b\)](#), [Rychalovska \(2016\)](#), [Ormeño and Molnár \(2015\)](#), [Eusepi and Preston \(2017\)](#), and [Cole and Milani \(2017\)](#) all consider adaptive learning with a constant gain and find a number of desirable properties including near universal improvements in model in-sample fit, the ability to capture survey forecasts of macroeconomic aggregates ([Milani 2011](#); [Ormeño and Molnár 2015](#); [Cole and Milani 2017](#)), or a lessened reliance in some cases on habit persistence or indexation in order to generate persistence ([Milani 2006, 2007](#)).

In light of these findings, we investigate the exact mechanisms that generate improvements in in-sample fit in estimated DSGE models using one of the most frequently studied bounded rationality modeling strategy: adaptive learning with a constant gain, also known as constant gain learning (CGL).² Specifically, we investigate whether improvements in fit are evidence for the theory of adaptive learning or a consequence of model misspecification brought about by the RE assumption. One reason to think that it may be the latter is the striking consistency among the estimation results in boundedly rational DSGE comparisons to RE across a range of models. In particular, we note three stylized facts that emerge from these estimation studies:

1. Model fit significantly improves under adaptive learning for almost any specification of expectations considered.
2. The inference on the structural parameters of the model is mostly unchanged compared to inference under RE.
3. The gain parameters, which correspond to the persistence in expectations, are

¹The lack of persistence generated by DSGE models under RE is well-known. These modifications include ad hoc corrections such as adding lags of the endogenous variables to the structural equations ([Gali and Gertler 1999](#) and [Ireland \(2004\)](#)), changes to preference such as habit persistence ([Fuhrer 2000](#)), changes to inflation setting by firm through inflation indexation ([Cogley and Sbordone 2008](#)), or adding information problems such as rule-of-thumb behavior ([Amato and Laubach 2003](#)), or rational inattention/sticky information ([Mankiw and Reis 2002](#); [Ball et al. 2005](#)). Armed with subset of these modifications, [Del Negro et al. \(2007\)](#) declare that the New Keynesian model fits the data well enough to be used for policy evaluation.

²Though we have confined this paper to DSGE models and constant gain learning, other modeling frameworks might exhibit the same patterns. For example, [Chow \(1989\)](#) examines present value models and rejects rational expectations in favor of adaptive expectations.

estimated to be relatively small.

To illustrate, Table 1 reports the parameter estimates from two of the most widely cited studies on estimated New Keynesian models with adaptive learning: Milani (2007) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b). Milani investigates adaptive learning in a small scale DSGE model, while Slobodyan and Wouters investigate learning in the medium scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007). The table reports some key parameter estimates from the two studies to allow a comparison between estimation results obtained under RE to those obtained under adaptive learning. We restrict attention to the case where the agents' perceived law of motion takes the functional form of minimum state variable (MSV) solution, although, similar results are often seen for other perceived law of motion specifications.

First, note that the model under CGL exhibits a significant improvement in in-sample fit as measured by marginal log-likelihood relative to RE. Second, the difference between the key parameters that describe monetary policy and the exogenous shocks are small.³ In fact, nearly all of the parameters estimates under CGL remain within the highest posterior density (HPD) interval of the RE counterparts, which implies that they are statistically indistinguishable from one another. Finally, the gain parameters that govern how agents update beliefs in the learning algorithm are estimated to be relatively small.

The second stylized fact is often interpreted as evidence that persistence at a business cycle frequency explains the observed improvement in fit because small changes in the structural parameters are interpreted as the model fitting the data in the same way as under RE. However, the third fact - small estimated values for the gain parameters - complicates this interpretation. Small gain parameters such as these can imply extreme persistence in the learning process that goes far beyond business cycle frequencies.

For example, Figure 1 shows the time path under learning of the CGL-MSV case of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b) for all beliefs initialized at steady state with the exception of inflation. For inflation, we assume that in the first quarter of 1948, the agents assume that steady state inflation rate is 0.5% higher than the actual value. As the figure shows, the effects of such beliefs would still be felt today at the estimated value of the gain.⁴ Chevillon and Mavroeidis (2017) recently highlight this feature of CGL to show that when gains are small, relative to sample size, that learning may actually generate long memory in the endogenous variables. This points to CGL as potentially

³There is a transcription error between the working paper and published versions of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b), where the 5% column of the HPD intervals is reported in the mean column. This explains the discrepancies between this table and the published version.


⁴For the simulation, we set the variance-covariance matrix of the least squares algorithm to that of the relevant variances of each variable obtained under RE and we hold these values fixed.

Table 1: Stylized facts of estimated NK models with CGL

Slobodyan and Wouters JEDC 2012				Milani JME 2007			
	RE	CGL-MSV	Difference		RE	CGL - MSV	Difference
Monetary policy & habits				Monetary policy & habits			
MP inflation	2.04 [1.75, 2.33]	1.91 [1.58, 2.22]	0.13*	MP inflation	1.433 [1.06, 1.81]	1.484 [1.08, 1.90]	-0.051*
MP output	0.09 [0.05, 0.13]	0.13 [0.07, 0.18]	-0.04*	MP output gap	0.792 [0.425, 1.165]	0.801 [0.433, 1.18]	-0.009*
MP output growth	0.22 [0.18, 0.27]	0.19 [0.15, 0.24]	0.03*	MP smoothing	0.89 [0.849, 0.93]	0.914 [0.875, 0.947]	-0.024*
MP smoothing	0.81 [0.77, 0.85]	0.84 [0.80, 0.88]	-0.03*	Habits	0.911 [0.717, 0.998]	0.117 [0.006, 0.289]	0.794
Habits	0.71 [0.64, 0.78]	0.80 [0.75, 0.84]	-0.09				
AR parameters				AR Parameters			
Productivity	0.96 [0.94, 0.98]	0.96 [0.94, 0.99]	0.00*	Demand shock	0.87 [0.8, 0.93]	0.845 [0.776, 0.908]	0.025*
Risk premium	0.22 [0.08, 0.36]	0.23 [0.13, 0.32]	-0.01*	Price mark-up	0.02 [0.0005, 0.07]	0.854 [0.778, 0.93]	-0.834
Gov. spending	0.98 [0.96, 0.99]	0.96 [0.96, 0.99]	0.02*				
Investment	0.71 [0.62, 0.81]	0.45 [0.33, 0.56]	0.26				
MP shock	0.15 [0.04, 0.24]	0.15 [0.05, 0.26]	0.00*				
Price mark-up	0.89 [0.81, 0.97]	0.93 [0.88, 0.97]	-0.04*				
Wage mark-up	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.00*				
St. Dev. Shocks				St. Dev Shocks			
Productivity	0.46 [0.41, 0.51]	0.47 [0.42, 0.52]	-0.01*	MP Shock	0.933 [0.84, 1.04]	0.86 [0.777, 0.953]	0.073*
Risk premium	0.24 [0.20, 0.28]	0.25 [0.22, 0.28]	-0.01*	Demand shock	1.067 [0.89, 1.22]	1.67 [1.47, 1.91]	-0.603
Gov. spending	0.53 [0.48, 0.58]	0.53 [0.48, 0.58]	0.00*	Price mark-up	1.146 [1.027, 1.27]	1.15 [1.02, 1.31]	-0.004*
Investment	0.45 [0.37, 0.53]	0.61 [0.53, 0.68]	-0.16				
MP shock	0.24 [0.22, 0.27]	0.24 [0.21, 0.26]	0.00*				
Price mark-up	0.14 [0.11, 0.17]	0.14 [0.12, 0.16]	0.00*				
Wage mark-up	0.24 [0.21, 0.28]	0.23 [0.20, 0.26]	0.01*				
Gains	-	0.017 [0.006, 0.021]		Gains		0.018 [0.0133, 0.0231]	
Marginal Likelihood	-922.75	-910.97		Marginal Likelihood	-765.45	-759.08	

Notes: This table only reports a subset of the parameter estimates. Similar patterns are observed for the remaining parameters. The columns labeled "Difference" show the simple difference between the RE and CGL parameter estimates with asterisks denoting when the changes fall inside of the 95% HPD intervals of the RE estimate. The published version of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b) does not report the HPD intervals for some estimates. We obtained these values from a working paper version dated 2009.

Figure 1: Small Gain Example



Notes: Return to steady state under constant gain learning in the Smets and Wouters model using [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012b\)](#) posterior mode estimates (Column 2 in Figure 1).

explaining long run persistent expectation driven movements in macroeconomic data but not movements at typical business cycle frequencies.⁵

We show that one explanation for the three stylized facts lies in the separation of the estimation of structural parameters from the estimation of beliefs in CGL models. Under RE, the structure of the model and beliefs are tightly linked. These linkages imply nonlinear cross-equation restrictions that enforce, for example, sign and zero restrictions on the model’s predictions of the covariance and autocovariances of the observable data. Relaxing RE, by assuming that beliefs are not tied to the structure of the model, can significantly alter these restrictions, allowing the model to better fit the data without increasing the number of freely estimated parameters or introducing new mechanisms

⁵It is well-known that the choice of initial beliefs can have a significant impact on estimation results. Both [Berardi and Galimberti \(2017\)](#) and [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012b\)](#) explore the effect of initial beliefs on model fit but neither study makes the connection between these effects and the overall role or lack thereof of time-variation in expectations for small gains.

to generate persistence. Furthermore, we show that this is a property of any linearized DSGE model. This suggests that improvements in fit may say more about the misspecification of the model under RE than the veracity of the specific bounded rationality assumption under study.

To illustrate the point, we estimate a New Keynesian model following [Ireland \(2004\)](#) under five different expectations assumptions: RE, two common variants of CGL, and a restricted case of each learning model that prevents any time-variation in expectations, which we call fixed beliefs (FB). The fixed belief cases allow us to relax the RE assumption without introducing new freely estimated parameters or persistence through expectation. The two variants of CGL are Euler-equation CGL (EE-CGL) following [Evans and Honkapohja \(2001\)](#) and infinite-horizon CGL (IH-CGL) following [Preston \(2005\)](#). We perfectly nest all five expectational assumptions by using the MSV solution of the model for the perceived law of motion under CGL and by calibrating its initial value to that obtained from a full sample estimation of the model under RE. Therefore, in theory, if the RE model is correctly specified, then all five expectation assumptions would yield the same in-sample fit and parameter estimates.

We compare the five different models' in-sample fit, measured by log likelihood; the real-time out-of-sample fit of the key endogenous variables and inflation expectations, measured by root mean forecast squared error; and following [McCallum \(2001\)](#) by comparing the models predicted variances and autocovariance functions. We find that the four bounded rationality cases largely generate results consistent with the three stylized facts. All FB and CGL strategies significantly improve the model's in-sample fit and show improvements in out-of-sample forecast accuracy relative to RE. We find that the parameters estimates are similar across all four specifications. And, we find that the gain parameter estimates for the CGL cases are small.

Comparing the two adaptive learning specifications to their fixed belief counterparts, we find no significant differences between the EE-CGL and EE-FB cases. They have a similar fit of the data including generating inflation expectations with a similar fit to the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), they predict fairly similar persistence in response to shocks for the endogenous variables, and they imply similar autocorrelation functions. This indicates that the relaxation of the RE restrictions alone, and not time variation of expectation explains the majority of the observed improvement in fit. For the IH cases, however, we do find marginal increases in fit relative to the fixed belief case, substantive additional persistence generated via agents' beliefs, and different autocorrelation predictions for key endogenous variables when agents are learning, which indicates that the learning assumption materially adds to the predictions of the model

beyond relaxing the RE restrictions. Therefore, only in the IH case do we conclude that learning makes a positive contribution towards fitting the data.

Finally, we return to the model of [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#) and estimate it under RE and EE-FB to assess the importance of the RE restrictions to explaining improvements in fit in a more policy-relevant environment. We compare the estimation results to those of [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012b\)](#). We find that EE-FB generates increases in the in-sample fit that are comparable to those found by Slobodyan and Wouters, which is consistent with a relaxation of the RE restrictions explaining a significant portion of the improvements reported under adaptive learning.

There are three takeaways from this exercise. First, the results actually provide strong support for considering bounded rationality assumptions, especially infinite-horizon adaptive learning, as alternatives to RE. Deviating from rationality with infinite-horizon learning clearly improves in-sample and out-of-sample model fit, while maintaining the standard theoretical structure of the agent's decision problem. Second, CGL appears best suited to explain long run drifts in beliefs rather than persistence at a business cycle frequency. Finally, our results demonstrate that comparisons between bounded rationality strategies and RE should be done with care. Many comparisons say more about the misspecification of the model under RE than the benefits of the particular expectation formation strategy, which is consistent with other evidence from the DSGE-VAR literature ([Cole and Milani 2017](#)). Learning strategies should be benchmarked to an appropriate counterpart, fixed belief or otherwise, that is as close to RE as possible. In this way, one can distinguish whether the improvements in fit come from the different restrictions imposed on the structural parameters or the dynamics associated with the particular expectation formation process under consideration.

The final point is especially relevant when comparing CGL specifications to RE that use perceived laws of motion that do not nest RE or when choosing, estimating, or calibrating initial beliefs. These modeling choices will have similar and in some cases larger effects on the cross-equation restrictions, which can be hard to anticipate. [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012a\)](#), for example, shows that assuming parsimonious forecasting models that utilize endogenous variables in favour of exogenous shocks significantly increases model fit. They also do thorough robustness testing on this result. Documenting that significant increases in fit occur without allowing time-varying beliefs, which can vary widely with the choice of the initial beliefs. Updating beliefs is found to make a statistically significant but decidedly more modest additional contribution to fit once the initial deviation from rationality is taken into account. The dependence on initial beliefs points to the same mechanisms that we highlight in this paper, rather than persistence at the

business cycle frequency, as the explanation for improved model fit.

In the next section, we present examples of how bounded rationality strategies increase fit by altering cross-equation restrictions. In Section 3, we introduce a parsimonious DSGE model and explore the reduced form mappings implied under the five different expectations assumptions. In Section 4, we estimate the model under the different expectations assumptions and compare the results along the aforementioned dimensions. In Section 5, we explore EE-FB in a medium scale DSGE model and revisit the stylized facts. Section 6 concludes.

2 The effect of relaxing RE

To illustrate the effect of relaxing the RE assumption in a DSGE model, consider the following univariate example:

$$x_t = \alpha + \beta E_t(x_{t+1}) + w_t \tag{1}$$

where $w_t = \rho w_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{2,t}$ and $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma)$. The model has the parameters α , β , ρ , and σ , which we refer to throughout the paper as the *structural parameters*. Under RE, the model has a MSV solution of the form

$$x_t = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b}w_t \tag{2}$$

$$w_t = \rho w_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{3}$$

which is characterised by the model's *reduced form parameters*: \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . The reduced form parameters are nonlinear combinations of the underlying structural parameters, where $\mathbf{a} = \alpha/(1 - \beta)$ and $\mathbf{b} = 1/(1 - \rho\beta)$.

Typically, an econometrician is interested in obtaining estimates of the structural parameters while only observing x_t . The reduced form is a state space model and therefore estimates of the structural parameters may be obtained using likelihood-based techniques with the Kalman filter. Identification of the individual structural parameters usually requires calibrating some subset of parameters (such as β in this case). This setup leads to the following relationships between the reduced form parameters (\mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b}), which if freely estimated would reflect the underlying correlations in the data, and the non-calibrated

structural parameters of interest:

$$\alpha|_{RE} = \frac{\mathbf{a}}{(1 - \beta)} \quad (4)$$

$$\rho|_{RE} = \frac{\mathbf{b} - 1}{\beta \mathbf{b}} \quad (5)$$

From here it is clear that the structural parameters are nonlinear combinations of the reduced form parameters, where bounds placed on the structural parameters by theory may limit the possible value that the reduced form parameters may take.

Now consider the same model under adaptive learning of the MSV solution. The perceived law of motion for the economy is given by Equations (2) and (3), but \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are assumed to be unknown to the agents. Agents estimate \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} via recursive least squares with a constant gain:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{a}_t \\ \mathbf{b}_t \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{a}_{t-1} \\ \mathbf{b}_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} + \gamma \mathbf{R}_t^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ w_t \end{pmatrix} \left((1 \ w_t) \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{a}_{t-1} \\ \mathbf{b}_{t-1} \end{pmatrix} - x_t \right) \quad (6)$$

$$\mathbf{R}_t = \mathbf{R}_{t-1} + \gamma (w_t' w_t - \mathbf{R}_{t-1}), \quad (7)$$

where $0 < \gamma < 1$; \mathbf{a}_0 , \mathbf{b}_0 , and \mathbf{R}_0 are appropriate initial values of the recursion, and \mathbf{R}_t is the estimated variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, the actual law of motion for the economy is given by

$$x_t = \mathbf{a}_{t-1} + \mathbf{b}_{t-1} w_t \quad (8)$$

$$w_t = \rho w_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \quad (9)$$

plus Equations (6) and (7), where $\mathbf{a}_{t-1} = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{a}_{t-1}$ and $\mathbf{b}_{t-1} = (\beta \mathbf{b}_{t-1} \rho + 1)$. The parameters of interest are now α , β , ρ , σ , and γ . And, the model again may be estimated using likelihood based techniques just like RE.

From the econometrician's perspective, adaptive learning allows for time-variation in the reduced form parameters of the model, which may capture more complicated dynamics present in the data. But it also changes the mapping from the reduced form parameters to the key structural parameters given by Equations (4) and (5). To see how, consider the case when no time-variation is allowed by setting $\gamma = 0$, which fixes $\mathbf{a}_t = \mathbf{a}_0 = a^{FB}$ and $\mathbf{b}_t = \mathbf{b}_0 = b^{FB}$. This implies the following relationship between the structural parameters and the reduced form

$$\alpha|_{FB} = -\beta a^{FB} + \mathbf{a} \quad (10)$$

$$\rho|_{FB} = \frac{\mathbf{b} - 1}{\beta b^{FB}}. \quad (11)$$

The two structural parameters of interest are now linear in the reduce form parameters.

If one compares Equations (4) and (5) to (10) and (11), then conditional on a^{FB} and b^{FB} being set to their RE values, the two cases are equivalent and the structural parameters are the same. However, if these parameters are set differently or there is misspecification under RE, then the fixed belief case is by construction less restricted and allows both the structural parameters and the reduced form parameters to take on different values. To illustrate the empirical implications of this we present a specific model below.

2.1 Empirical implications

Suppose we are interested in estimating the structural parameters of an endowment economy with a monetary authority that adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to changes in inflation. We can characterize inflation using the monetary policy rule and the Fisher equation:

$$i_t = \phi_\pi \pi_t + \epsilon_t \quad (12)$$

$$i_t = E_t \pi_{t+1} + r_t, \quad (13)$$

where r_t is the exogenous real rate of return that follows an AR(1) process, $r_t = \theta r_{t-1} + \eta_t$, and ϵ_t is an i.i.d monetary policy shock. The inflation process can be written in a similar form as (1),

$$\pi_t = \frac{1}{\phi_\pi} E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{1}{\phi_\pi} r_t, \quad (14)$$

which implies the same reduce form for π_t under RE and FB

$$\pi_t = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b} r_t. \quad (15)$$

Both the interest rate and inflation are observable, which means that regardless of

the expectation assumption, the parameter ϕ_π is pinned down by the monetary policy rule (12) and the contemporaneous correlation of the interest rates and inflation. The relationship between the remaining structural parameters and the reduced form, however, are different. Under rational expectations, the reduced form is $\mathbf{a} = 0$ and $\mathbf{b} = 1/(\phi_\pi - \theta)$, while under fixed beliefs it is $\mathbf{a} = a^{FB}/\phi_\pi$ and $\mathbf{b} = \frac{1+b^{FB}\theta}{\phi_\pi}$. For both expectations assumptions, there is a different relationship between \mathbf{b} and the persistence parameter θ . Depending on how b^{FB} is chosen and the actual correlations in the data, $\hat{\mathbf{b}}$, the implied persistence of the two models may differ.

Figure 2 shows what happens to the range of permissible values of θ when we vary the value of $\hat{\mathbf{b}}$, where b^{FB} is calibrated to the RE solution when $\theta = 0.9$. For the same range of $\hat{\mathbf{b}}$, there is a wider range of possible structural parameters under FB. The FB formulation adds no additional persistence as would be the case under learning. But, given the same data, the estimated persistence may be different, while other structural parameters remain the same.

This illustrates a mechanism that can explain a large portion of the significant improvement in fit in models that deviate from RE. The interconnectedness of structural parameters through the non-linear cross-equation restrictions is significantly altered under non-rational expectations. As a consequence, such models may fit data more readily irrespective of the economic theory which motivates the use of the bounded rationality assumption. The fact that these changes are nonlinear means that what appear to be small changes in the structural parameters from the econometrician's perspective, may imply significant changes in the model's predictions for the observable data, which explains why fit improves when parameter estimates appear to remain largely the same.

2.2 The general case

We can generalize this insight to any first-order approximated DSGE model. Consider the linearized structural equations of a DSGE model, which we write as


$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{\Gamma} + \mathbf{A}\mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathbf{B}\mathbb{E}_t y_{t+1} + \mathbf{D}\mathbf{v}_t + \mathbf{K}\varepsilon_t \quad (16)$$

$$\mathbf{v}_t = \mathbf{R}\mathbf{v}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_t, \quad (17)$$

where \mathbf{y}_t is a vector endogenous variables and \mathbf{v}_t is vector of autoregressive exogenous shocks. The minimum state variable RE solution of the model takes the following form

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{c} + \mathfrak{F}\mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathbf{\Omega}\mathbf{v}_t + \mathfrak{K}\varepsilon_t. \quad (18)$$

Figure 2: Reduced Form to Structural Form Range



Notes: Parameter $\theta = 0.9$ for the FB belief calibration. Solid line is FB, dashed line is RE.

Collect the parameters of interest into the vector Θ . The RE restrictions can be summarized by the mapping $F : \Theta \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{F}, \mathfrak{Q}\}$, which governs how changes in the elements of Θ change \mathfrak{C} , \mathfrak{F} , or \mathfrak{Q} . In general, the mapping is highly nonlinear and often has no closed form solution. The MSV solution has a state space representation and inference on Θ may be obtained by maximum likelihood. To this aim, let

$$\Theta^{MLE} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\Theta} L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F),$$

where L is the likelihood function, \mathbf{y}^{obs} is observable data, and F is the aforementioned mapping.

Now consider the case of boundedly rational agents with fixed beliefs. As in the simple example, suppose that beliefs are of the form of Equation (18), where $\mathbf{C}_{|\Theta^{MLE}}^{FB}$, $\mathbf{F}_{|\Theta^{MLE}}^{FB}$, and $\mathbf{Q}_{|\Theta^{MLE}}^{FB}$ are formed using the ML estimates obtained from the RE model. Under this assumption, the data generating process for the economy takes the following form

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \underbrace{(\mathbf{\Gamma} + \mathbf{B}\mathbf{C}^{FB})}_{\mathfrak{C}} + \underbrace{(\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{B}\mathbf{F}^{FB})}_{\mathfrak{F}} \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \underbrace{(\mathbf{B}\mathbf{Q}^{FB}\mathbf{R} + \mathbf{D})}_{\mathfrak{Q}} \mathbf{v}_t + \mathfrak{K}\varepsilon_t, \quad (19)$$

where Equation (18) is substituted in for $\mathbb{E}_t \mathbf{y}_{t+1}$. Note the following regarding Equation (19):

1. Equation (19) retains the same reduced form as Equation (18).
2. Conditioning on \mathbf{C}^{FB} , \mathbf{F}^{FB} , and \mathbf{Q}^{FB} , Equation (19) is described by the same structural parameters as Equation (18), which we collect in the vector Ξ .

For the econometrician, the mapping of interest is now $G : \Xi \times \Theta^{MLE} \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{F}, \mathfrak{Q}\}$. The question here is whether Ξ^{MLE} from Equation (19) is equal to Θ^{MLE} from Equation (18) and whether

$$\max_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) = \max_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, \mathbf{G}, \Theta^{MLE}).$$

Consider the case where the true data generating process is projected onto an unrestricted reduced form that nests the RE solution

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathfrak{C}^T + \mathfrak{F}^T \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathfrak{Q}^T \mathbf{v}_t + \mathfrak{K}^T \varepsilon_t, \quad (20)$$

where in the event that Equation (18) is correctly specified, it is equivalent to the true data generating process.

Theorem 1: *Given Equation (20) and the mappings $F : \Theta \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{F}, \mathfrak{Q}\}$ and $G : \Xi \times \Theta^{MLE} \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{F}, \mathfrak{Q}\}$ such that $\Theta^{MLE} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\Theta} L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F)$,*

- a. if $\Theta^* = F^{-1}(\{\mathfrak{C}^T, \mathfrak{F}^T, \mathfrak{Q}^T\})$ exists and is in the feasible parameter space, i.e. satisfies determinacy or other theoretically imposed restrictions, then*

$$\Theta^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) = \operatorname{argmax}_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, G, \Theta^{MLE})$$

and

$$\max_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) = \max_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, G, \Theta^{MLE})$$

- b. if $\Theta^* = F^{-1}(\{\mathfrak{C}^T, \mathfrak{F}^T, \mathfrak{Q}^T\})$ does not exist or, exists but is not in the feasible parameter space, then*

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) \neq \operatorname{argmax}_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, G, \Theta^{MLE})$$

and

$$\max_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) \leq \max_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, G, \Theta^{MLE})$$

Proof. For part *a*, if $\Theta = \Xi$, then by construction Equation (19) is equal to Equation (18), Ξ^{MLE} from Equation (19) is equal to Θ^{MLE} from Equation (18), and

$$\max_{\Theta} \mathbb{E}L(\Theta | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, F) = \max_{\Xi} \mathbb{E}L^*(\Xi | \mathbf{y}^{obs}, G, \Theta^{MLE}).$$

For part *b*, the non-equivalence of the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates is straightforward. We obtain the inequality in likelihoods by noticing that the range of mapping F is, by construction, a subset of the range of G because $F(\Theta) := G(\Theta, \Theta)$. \square

The relaxation considered here is the starting point for most models of bounded rationality. Therefore, without adding extra structural parameters that are freely estimated or allowing for time-varying beliefs, the model becomes less restricted, while maintaining the same functional form, i.e. Equation (20), Equation (19), and Equation (18) continue

to nest one another. This, of course, does not imply that further modification such as assuming time-variation in \mathfrak{C} , \mathfrak{F} , and \mathfrak{Q} as in adaptive learning will not better fit the data, but it highlights another mechanism through which boundedly rational models may improve in-sample fit without any time-variation in the reduced form parameters. In the remainder of the paper, we specifically ask whether this mechanism is empirically relevant and to what degree.

3 Expectations and the reduced form

We consider five different assumptions for expectations that share a common reduced form:

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathfrak{C}_t + \mathfrak{F}_t \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathfrak{Q}_t \mathbf{v}_t + \mathfrak{R} \varepsilon_t, \quad (21)$$

Each assumption imposes different restrictions on \mathfrak{C}_t , \mathfrak{F}_t , and \mathfrak{Q}_t . In this section, we put forward a tractable model that allows for analytical derivation of the mapping from the structural parameters to the reduced form so that changes implied by different expectations assumptions can be studied in detail. Besides the RE approach, we consider two variations of adaptive learning and their respective FB counterparts.

The first adaptive learning approach we consider follows [Evans and Honkapohja \(2001\)](#) by assuming Euler-equation constant gain learning.⁶ In EE-CGL agents are only asked to form one-step-ahead forecasts and they ignore any implications of their forecasts for longer horizons. The appeal of this approach is that if the chosen forecasting process nests RE, then under well-known regularity conditions (E-stability) the agents' beliefs will stay in the neighborhood of the RE solution. Therefore, it allows for potentially complicated but bounded beliefs around the natural RE benchmark in a wide range of models.

The second approach we consider is infinite-horizon learning following [Preston \(2005\)](#), which asks agents to consider the implications of their beliefs on their entire decision problem. In many cases, this means solving out an agent's decision rule, given beliefs today, into the infinite future. The advantage of this approach is that decisions conditional on beliefs are consistent with the micro-foundations of the model at every point in time, which is not always true in the EE specifications. Like its EE counterpart, though, under well-known regularity conditions beliefs under constant gain learning will depart from those predicted under RE but in the long run tend, towards the RE solution.

⁶This is also the approach most often taken in the behavioral heterogeneous expectation literature as in [Hommes \(2013\)](#) and the references therein.

The two FB counterparts for the IH and EE specifications can be thought of as restricted cases, where the gain parameter in the learning algorithm is set to zero and not estimated. But it is important to distinguish these cases as standalone expectation assumptions because algebraically they are similar to other bounded rationality assumptions considered in the literature. For example, when expectations are assumed to be generated by fixed parameter VARs or other simple time series models as considered in [Cornea-Madeira et al. \(2017\)](#) or [Cole and Milani \(2017\)](#). Therefore, the impact on fit that these strategies have relative to RE are informative beyond MSV adaptive learning exercises.

3.1 The model

We study a parsimonious version of the New Keynesian model proposed by [Ireland \(2004\)](#). The microfoundations of the model are given in Appendix A. Following [Preston \(2005\)](#), the key equations under an unspecified expectations operator $\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t$ are

$$x_t = \bar{r}(1 - \beta)^{-1} - \omega \hat{a}_t + \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} [(1 - \beta)(x_{T+1} + \omega \rho_a \hat{a}_T) - (i_T - \hat{\pi}_{T+1}) - (\rho_a - 1)\hat{a}_T] \quad (22)$$

$$\pi_t = \frac{1 - \beta}{1 - \lambda_1 \beta} \bar{\pi} + \psi x_t - e_t + \lambda_1 \beta \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1 \beta)^{T-t} \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1} \pi_{T+1} + \psi x_{T+1} - e_{T+1} \right) \quad (23)$$

$$i_t = \bar{r} + \bar{\pi} + \theta_\pi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) + \theta_x x_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (24)$$

$$g_t = \hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_{t-1} + \bar{g} + \epsilon_{z,t} \quad (25)$$

$$x_t = \hat{y}_t - \omega a_t \quad (26)$$

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \epsilon_{a,t} \quad (27)$$

$$e_t = \rho_e e_{t-1} + \epsilon_{e,t}, \quad (28)$$

where x_t is the output gap, π_t is inflation, i_t is the nominal interest rate, g_t is the growth rate of output, y_t is the stochastically detrended level of output, a_t is a preference shock, e_t is a cost push shock, $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is a monetary policy shock, and $\epsilon_{z,t}$ is the detrended TFP shock. The individual variables are in log terms with their log steady state values written out explicitly such that at steady state $x_t = \bar{x} = 0$, $\pi_t = \bar{\pi}$, $i_t = \bar{r} + \bar{\pi}$, and $g_t = \bar{g}$.

We choose this model because it has no internal propagation mechanisms other than expectations. In fact, the minimum state variable RE solution does not depend on any lagged endogenous variables. This has the added benefit of allowing us to estimate the model without a projection facility, which is usually required to keep expectations from

becoming explosive during numerical optimization of the likelihood function. [Gaus and Ramamurthy \(2012\)](#) note that the choice of projection facility can have a significant effect on estimation outcomes, which may complicate a comparison with RE. In addition, the determinacy and E-stability conditions of the model perfectly coincide in all cases.⁷ This allows us to impose identical restrictions on the parameter space for all estimated versions of the model.

3.1.1 The state space

The model under unspecified expectations has the following state space representation

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{y}_t^{obs} &= \mathbf{H}\mathbf{X}_t \\ \mathbf{X}_t &= \mathbf{J}_{t-1} + \mathbf{M}_{t-1}\mathbf{X}_{t-1} + \mathbf{N}_{t-1}\varepsilon_t\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{J}_{t-1} = \mathbf{\Omega}_{t-1}^{-1}\mu_{t-1}$, $\mathbf{M}_{t-1} = \mathbf{\Omega}_{t-1}^{-1}\mathbf{\Psi}$, $\mathbf{N}_{t-1} = \mathbf{\Omega}_{t-1}^{-1}\zeta$,

$$\mu_{t-1} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{c}_t \\ \bar{r} + (1 - \theta_\pi)\bar{\pi} \\ \bar{g} \\ \mathbf{0}_{3 \times 1} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{\Omega}_{t-1} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I}_{2 \times 2} & \mathbf{0}_{2 \times 3} & -\mathbf{\Omega}_t \\ -\theta_x & -\theta_\pi & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -\omega & 0 \\ & \mathbf{0}_{2 \times 5} & & & & \mathbf{I}_{2 \times 2} & \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{\Psi} = \begin{pmatrix} & \mathbf{0}_{3 \times 7} & \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_a & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \rho_e \end{pmatrix}, \quad \zeta = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 2} & -1 & \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 4} \\ & \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 7} & \\ \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 2} & 1 & \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 4} \\ \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 3} & 1 & \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 3} \\ & \mathbf{0}_{1 \times 7} & \\ \mathbf{0}_{2 \times 5} & & \mathbf{I}_{2 \times 2} \end{pmatrix},$$

$\mathbf{y}_t^{obs} = (x_t, \pi_t, i_t, g_t)'$, and $\mathbf{X}_t = (x_t, \pi_t, i_t, g_t, y_t, a_t, e_t)'$. The expectation assumption chosen by the researcher directly restrict the possible values of \mathbf{c}_t and $\mathbf{\Omega}_t$, which become nonlinear functions of the structural parameters of the model. In what follows, we show

⁷The determinacy and E-stability condition for the model is the Taylor principle: $\theta_\pi > \frac{(\beta-1)\theta_x + \psi}{\psi}$.

how the different expectation assumption imply different relationships between \mathfrak{C}_t and \mathfrak{Q}_t and the structural parameters of interest.

3.1.2 Rational expectations

It is straightforward to show that imposing RE on Equations (22) and (23) allows them to be collapsed to a more familiar form:

$$x_t = \bar{r} + \mathbb{E}_t^{RE} x_{t+1} - (i_t - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t^{RE} \pi_{t+1}) + (1 - \omega)(1 - \rho_a)a_t \quad (29)$$

$$\pi_t = (1 - \beta)\bar{\pi} + \beta\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t^{RE} \pi_{t+1} + \psi x_t - e_t. \quad (30)$$

Substituting in Equation (24), we can map the model into the general form of Equations (16) and (17)

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{y}_t &= \mathbf{\Gamma} + \mathbf{A}\mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathbf{B}\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \mathbf{y}_{t+1} + \mathbf{D}\mathbf{v}_t + \mathbf{K}\varepsilon_t \\ \mathbf{v}_t &= \rho\mathbf{v}_{t-1} + \mathbf{u}_t, \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{y}_t = (x_t, \pi_t)'$, $\mathbf{v}_t = (a_t, e_t)'$, $\mathbf{u}_t = (\epsilon_{a,t}, \epsilon_{e,t})'$, $\varepsilon_t = (\epsilon_{i,t}, 0)'$,

$$\mathbf{\Gamma} = m \begin{pmatrix} \bar{\pi}(\theta_\pi\beta - 1) \\ -\bar{\pi}((\theta_x(\beta - 1) - 1 + \beta + \psi - \theta_\pi\psi)) \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{B} = m \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 - \theta_\pi\beta \\ \psi & \beta(1 + \theta_x) + \psi \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\mathbf{D} = m \begin{pmatrix} (\rho_a - 1)(\omega - 1) & \theta_\pi \\ (\rho_a - 1)(\omega - 1)\omega & -1 - \theta_x \end{pmatrix}, \quad \rho = \begin{pmatrix} \rho_a & 0 \\ 0 & \rho_e \end{pmatrix}$$

$m = (1 + \theta_x + \theta_\pi\psi)^{-1}$, $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{0}_{2 \times 2}$, and $\mathbf{K} = -\mathbf{I}_2$. Using the reduced form of Equation (21) and the method of undetermined coefficient, we can solve analytically for the RE solution in terms of the structural parameters: $\mathfrak{C}^{RE} = (0, \bar{\pi})'$,

$$\mathfrak{Q}^{RE} = \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{(\rho_a - 1)(\beta\rho_a - 1)(\omega - 1)}{1 + \theta_x - \theta_x\beta\rho_a + \beta\rho_a^2 + \theta_\pi\psi - \rho_a(1 + \beta + \psi)} & \frac{\theta_\pi - \rho_e}{1 + \theta_x - \theta_x\beta\rho_e + \beta\rho_e^2 + \theta_\pi\psi - \rho_e(1 + \beta + \psi)} \\ \frac{(\rho_a - 1)\psi(\omega - 1)}{1 + \theta_x - \theta_x\beta\rho_a + \beta\rho_a^2 + \theta_\pi\psi - \rho_a(1 + \beta + \psi)} & \frac{\rho_e - 1 - \theta_x}{1 + \theta_x - \theta_x\beta\rho_e + \beta\rho_e^2 + \theta_\pi\psi - \rho_e(1 + \beta + \psi)} \end{pmatrix}, \quad (31)$$

$\mathfrak{F}^{RE} = \mathbf{0}_{2 \times 2}$, and $\mathfrak{R}^{RE} = -\mathbf{I}$. This is of course the explicit mapping $F : \Theta \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{F}, \mathfrak{Q}\}$ discussed in Section.

There are two notable features of this mapping. First, RE places restrictions on the intercept term \mathfrak{C}^{RE} forcing them to be consistent with the steady state of the model, which will not be the case under the other expectation assumptions. Second, the mapping from the structural parameters to the reduced form of \mathfrak{Q}^{RE} is highly nonlinear. The mapping to each element of \mathfrak{Q}^{RE} is an eight degree polynomial in β , ψ , θ_π , θ_x , ρ_a , ρ_e , and ω . The nonlinearity of this mapping is important because it means that relatively small changes in the values of structural parameters can have large effects on the reduced form and vice versa.

3.1.3 Euler-equation learning and fixed beliefs

The next expectation assumptions we consider are EE-CGL and EE-FB. To implement these strategies, we start with the same structural equation as under RE given by Equations (16) and (17). We assume that the agents perceived law of motion (PLM) takes the same functional form of Equation (21)

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{C}^{EE} + \mathbf{Q}^{EE} \mathbf{v}_t + \varepsilon_t. \quad (32)$$

The agents estimate their belief parameters using past data by a constant gain recursive least squares algorithm

$$\mathbf{\Phi}_t = \mathbf{\Phi}_{t-1} + \gamma \mathbf{S}_t^{-1} \mathbf{z}_{t-1} (\mathbf{y}_t - 1 - \mathbf{z}'_{t-1} \mathbf{\Phi}_{t-1}) \quad (33)$$

$$\mathbf{S}_t = \mathbf{S}_{t-1} + \gamma (\mathbf{z}_{t-1} \mathbf{z}'_{t-1} - \mathbf{S}_{t-1}), \quad (34)$$

where \mathbf{z}_t is vector of data, $\mathbf{\Phi}_t$ is a vector of regression coefficients, \mathbf{S}_t is the estimated variance-covariance matrix, and γ is a matrix of gain parameters that govern the weight placed on new information.

Expectations under EE-CGL at time t are given by⁸

$$\mathbb{E}_t^{EE} \mathbf{y}_{t+1} = \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{EE} + \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{EE} \mathbf{R} \mathbf{v}_t. \quad (35)$$

Substituting Equation (35) in for the beliefs in Equation (16) yields the following mapping to the reduced form equations:

$$\mathfrak{C}_t^{EE} = \mathbf{\Gamma} + \mathbf{B} \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{EE} = m \left(\begin{array}{c} C_{t-1}^{EE,11} + (C_{t-1}^{EE,21} - \bar{\pi})(1 - \beta\theta_\pi) \\ C_{t-1}^{EE,11}\psi + C_{t-1}^{EE,21}(\beta(1 + \theta_x) + \psi) - \bar{\pi}(\theta_x(\beta - 1) + \psi(1 - \theta_\pi) + \beta - 1) \end{array} \right) \quad (36)$$

⁸As is common in the literature, we assume agents know \mathbf{R} .

and

$$\begin{aligned}\mathfrak{Q}_t^{EE} &= \mathbf{B}\mathfrak{Q}_{t-1}^{EE}\rho + \mathbf{D} \\ &= m \begin{pmatrix} 1 - \omega + \rho_a(Q_{t-1}^{EE,11} + Q_{t-1}^{EE,21}(1 - \theta_\pi\beta) + \omega - 1) & \theta_\pi + (Q_{t-1}^{EE,12} + Q_{t-1}^{EE,22} - \theta_\pi Q_{t-1}^{EE,22}\beta)\rho_e \\ Q_{t-1}^{EE,21}\rho_a(\beta(1 + \theta_x) + \psi) + \psi(1 - \omega + \rho_a(Q_{t-1}^{EE,11} + \omega - 1)) & \theta_x(Q_{t-1}^{EE,22}\beta\rho_e - 1) + Q_{t-1}^{EE,12}\rho_e\psi + Q_{t-1}^{EE,22}\rho_e(\beta + \psi) - 1, \end{pmatrix}\end{aligned}\quad (37)$$

where $C_{t-1}^{EE,ij}$ and $Q_{t-1}^{EE,ij}$ represent the i^{th} row and j^{th} column elements of \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{EE} and \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{EE} , respectively.

Comparing \mathfrak{C}^{RE} to \mathfrak{C}_t^{EE} , the restriction placed on the reduced form under RE are loosened under EE-CGL in two ways. First, the reduced forms intercepts are no longer explicitly tied to the steady states of the model. They depend on other structural parameters and beliefs, which frees them to vary over time. Second, comparing \mathfrak{Q}^{RE} to \mathfrak{Q}_t^{EE} , the degree of nonlinearity of the mapping from structural parameters to the reduced form has decreased. The reduction in nonlinearity allows for changes in structural parameters to have smaller effects on the other parameters, which allows these parameters to take on new values without having as significant an impact elsewhere in the model.

For example, consider the limit of the first element of \mathfrak{Q}_t^{EE} compared \mathfrak{Q}^{RE} as $\rho_a \rightarrow 1$. For the RE case, the coefficient goes to zero. Therefore, as the preference shock, a_t , becomes more persistent, its affect on the output gap approaches zero. This of course offsets the persistence by effectively removing the shock from the model. In the EE case, however, no such restriction is imposed. Here as ρ_a goes to one, $\mathfrak{Q}_t^{EE,11}$ goes to $m(Q_{t-1}^{EE,11} + Q_{t-1}^{EE,21}(1 - \theta_\pi\beta))$, which allows a more persistent preference shock to continue to affect the output gap so long as $Q_{t-1}^{EE,11}$ and $Q_{t-1}^{EE,21}$ are nonzero.

The EE-FB case implies the same reduced form relationships. The only difference between this case and EE-CGL is that time variation of \mathfrak{C} and \mathfrak{Q} is ruled out by assumption.

3.1.4 Infinite-horizon learning fixed beliefs

The infinite-horizon learning solution uses the full forward-looking decision rules given by Equation (22) and (23). This requires agents to forecast x_t and π_t as well as i_t for $T = t + 1, \dots, \infty$. In contrast, there is no need to forecast interest rates under EE-CGL. Therefore, to preserve our nested structure, we assume that agents know the coefficients of the Taylor rule, which allows them to construct their expectation of i_t using their forecast x_t and π_t from the same PLM assumed for the EE case (Equation 32). With this assumption, agents' expectations are computed as

$$\mathbb{E}_t^{IH} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \mathbf{y}_{T+1} = \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{IH} (1 - \beta)^{-1} + \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{IH} (\mathbf{I} - \beta \rho)^{-t} \rho \mathbf{v}_t \quad (38)$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}_t^{IH} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1 \beta)^{T-t} \mathbf{y}_{T+1} = \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{IH} (1 - \lambda_1 \beta)^{-1} + \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{IH} (\mathbf{I} - \lambda_1 \beta \rho)^{-t} \rho \mathbf{v}_t, \quad (39)$$

where \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{IH} and \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{IH} are the coefficients of Equation (32) estimated using the constant gain recursive least squares algorithm discussed previously. Substituting these expectations into Equation (22) and (23), the reduced form matrices take the following form $\mathfrak{C}_t^{IH} = \mathbf{\Gamma}_{IH} + \mathbf{B}_{IH} \mathbf{C}_{t-1}^{IH}$, where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{\Gamma}_{IH} &= m \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\bar{\pi}(\theta_\pi - 1)}{(1-\beta)} - \frac{(1-\beta)\bar{\pi}\theta_\pi}{(1-\beta\lambda)} \\ \frac{(1-\beta)\bar{\pi}(\theta_x + 1)}{(1-\beta\lambda)} + \frac{\bar{\pi}(\theta_\pi - 1)\psi}{(1-\beta)} \end{pmatrix}, \\ \mathbf{B}_{IH} &= m \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1-\beta(\theta_x + 1)}{(1-\beta)} - \frac{\beta\theta_\pi\lambda\psi}{(1-\beta\lambda)} & \frac{1-\beta\theta_\pi}{(1-\beta)} - \frac{\beta\theta_\pi(1-\lambda)}{(1-\beta\lambda)} \\ \frac{\beta\lambda\psi(\theta_x + 1)}{(1-\beta\lambda)} + \frac{\psi(1-\beta(\theta_x + 1))}{(1-\beta)} & \frac{\beta(1-\lambda)(\theta_x + 1)}{(1-\beta\lambda)} + \frac{\psi(1-\beta\theta_\pi)}{(1-\beta)} \end{pmatrix}, \end{aligned}$$

and $\mathbf{\Omega}_t^{IH} = \mathbf{B}'_{1,IH} \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{IH} (\mathbf{I} - \beta \rho)^{-1} \rho + \mathbf{B}'_{2,IH} \mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{IH} (\mathbf{I} - \beta \lambda_1 \rho)^{-1} \rho + \mathbf{D}$, where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{B}'_{1,IH} &= m \begin{pmatrix} 1 - \beta(1 + \theta_x) & 1 - \beta\theta_\pi \\ \psi(1 - \beta(\theta_x + 1)) & \psi(1 - \beta\theta_\pi) \end{pmatrix}, \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{B}'_{2,IH} &= m \begin{pmatrix} -\beta\theta_\pi\lambda\psi & -\beta\theta_\pi(1 - \lambda) \\ \beta\lambda\psi(\theta_x + 1) & \beta(1 - \lambda_1)(\theta_x + 1) \end{pmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

The IH-FB case is obtained by again setting $\gamma = 0$.

The infinite-horizon specifications case dramatically alters the mapping from structural parameters to the reduced form, while still nesting the RE solutions. The implied restrictions turn out to allow a wider range of possible reduced form parameterizations than is feasible under either RE or the EE specifications. We illustrate this numerically in next section.

3.2 Understanding how RE restrictions affect fit

We use a numerical exercise to illustrate the practical implications of the nonlinear relationship between the structural and reduced form parameters. The idea of this exercise is to explore the range of the reduced form parameter, $\mathbf{\Omega}$, implied for a range of key

structural parameters under different expectation assumptions.

We use the EE-FB and IH-FB assumptions to calculate the implied value of Ω for $1.4 < \theta_\pi < 1.6$, $0.1 < \theta_x < 0.3$, $.75 < \rho_a < .95$, and $.65 < \rho_e < .85$. We calibrate the remaining parameters to $\beta = 0.995$, $\psi = 0.1$, $\lambda = 0.93$, and $\omega = 0.06$ and set the fixed beliefs to the RE values implied by the midpoint of the respective ranges. We then ask what values of θ_π , θ_x , ρ_a , and ρ_e are necessary to generate the same Ω under RE. To be precise, we let $\Xi = (\theta_\pi, \theta_x, \rho_a, \rho_e)'$ and calculate $G(\Xi, \bar{\Theta})$ such that $\bar{\Theta} = (1.5, 0.2, 0.85, 0.75)'$ for the aforementioned range of values for Ξ . We then calculate $\Theta^{RE} = F^{-1}(G(\Xi, \bar{\Theta}))$ and compare Θ^{RE} to Ξ .




Figure 3 shows the comparison. Panels A and B show the reduced form values of Ω^{EE} and Ω^{IH} for the chosen grid, where the large black dots represents the values of Ω^{RE} implied by $\bar{\Theta}$. Panels C, D, E, and F show the grid of points for Ξ in red that is used to calculate Ω^{EE} and Ω^{IH} , respectively, and the implied RE values of Θ^{RE} that give rise to the same reduced form values in blue.

The EE and IH cases reveal two different ways in which the RE restrictions can be relaxed. In the EE case, the reduction in nonlinearity means that same reduced form parameter values can be explained by a wider range of Taylor rule parameters and AR coefficients. This means that there is a less of a trade-off when fitting deterministic components of monetary policy and the shocks simultaneously. The persistence parameters can move over a much larger range without significantly affecting the value of the Taylor rule parameters. The RE case more tightly links these quantities together. Therefore, small adjustments to one parameter to fit some aspect of the data has more significant spillovers onto the other parameters in the model.




The IH case, however, is different. It explains a significantly larger reduced form space than is possible under RE for the same parameter values. The space is so large that the RE solution is incapable of covering the same area with parameter values that satisfy the Taylor principle or stationarity. The key takeaway from this exercise is that it is not necessary for the structural parameters to change in any substantial way to fundamentally alter the way the model fits the data. The nonlinearity of the mappings makes it so that small changes may imply a fundamentally different fit.

Figure 3: The mapping from structural parameters to the reduced form

EE-CGL



IH-CGL



Notes: The black dots in Panels A and B show the RE reduced form value implied by $\bar{\Theta} = (1.5, 0.2, 0.85, 0.75)'$. The black dashed line in figure D denotes the determinacy condition for the model. Points below the line correspond to indeterminate solutions under RE.

4 Taking the model to the data

In this section, we estimate the five versions of the model using maximum likelihood and compare the in-sample fit, the out-of-sample fit, the predicted impulse responses for the structural shocks, and the implied moments. For estimation, we use US data from 1984q1 through 2008q3. As observables, we use the CBO measure of the output gap, the GDP deflator measure of inflation, the three-month Treasury bill rate, and growth rate of real GDP, which are each expressed in quarterly rates.

To avoid known issues with weak identification, we calibrate some of the structural parameters. We set $\beta = 0.995$ and $\bar{\pi} = 0.005$, which implies a steady state nominal interest rate of 4% in annualized terms.⁹ We set the slope of the Phillips curve, ψ , to 0.1 following Ireland (2004), which in the Calvo pricing framework would correspond to the average firm adjusting its price roughly once a year. Finally, we calibrate the mean growth rate of output, \bar{g} , to the average growth rate observed over the estimation period.¹⁰

The remaining parameters $\{\theta_\pi, \theta_x, \omega, \rho_a, \rho_e, \sigma_a, \sigma_e, \sigma_i, \sigma_g\}$ are estimated.¹¹ In the CGL models, we also estimate the gain parameters. We allow there to be separate gains for output gap and inflation (γ_x, γ_π) to permit differing amounts of learning to contribute to each variable.

⁹This puts the model slightly at odds with the data over our sample period, which has a mean inflation rate of around 2.5% and a mean interest rate of around 4.8%. However, the mean output gap in our sample is almost -0.75%, which makes it unclear whether the mean values of inflation and the interest rates actually reflect steady-state values. If $\bar{\pi}$ is freely estimated we find values ranging between 1% and 2%.

¹⁰We find that our results with respect to model fit are not sensitive to these calibration choices or to freely estimating all of the parameters. However, freely estimating all parameters does result in significant difference in parameter estimates across the different model specifications, some of which reflects weak identification.

¹¹To construct confidence intervals for the structural parameter estimates, we use a method similar to the one proposed by Stock and Watson (1998) for time-varying parameter models. We employ this method because the constrained optimization routine we use to maximize the likelihood functions provides unreliable numerical estimates of the Hessian matrix. The confidence intervals are constructed for each parameter by selecting a grid surrounding the ML estimate of interest. We then re-maximize the log-likelihood function by searching over all other parameters, while holding the parameter of interest fixed at one point on the grid. The maximized log-likelihood value obtained at that point is then compared to the original maximum log-likelihood value using a likelihood ratio test. The set of points on the grid that yield maximized log-likelihood values that fail to reject the null hypothesis that the true parameter vector lies in the restricted parameter space at the 5% level constitutes the 95% confidence interval.

Table 2: ML estimates

	RE	EE-FB	EE-CGL	IH-FB	IH-CGL
θ_π	1.577 [1.31 , 1.97]	1.123 [0.99 , 1.61]	1.114 [0.99 , 1.59]	1.578 [1.32 , 1.94]	1.591 [1.45 , 1.73]
θ_x	0.166 [0.08 , 0.29]	0.208 [0.11 , 0.36]	0.211 [0.11 , 0.37]	0.160 [0.08 , 0.26]	0.140 [0.07 , 0.23]
ω	0.000 [0.00 , 0.02]	0.000 [0.00 , 0.01]	0.000 [0.00* , 0.03]	0.066 [0.00 , 0.48]	0.000 [0.00 , 0.00]
ρ_a	0.933 [0.87 , 1.00]	0.926 [0.86 , 0.99]	0.912 [0.85 , 0.98]	0.973 [0.95 , 0.99]	0.995 [0.99 , 0.99]
ρ_e	0.967 [0.87 , 1.00]	0.917 [0.80 , 1.00]	0.927 [0.81 , 0.99]	0.684 [0.50 , 0.86]	0.543 [0.32 , 0.78]
$\sigma_a \times 100$	1.671 [0.06 , 0.68]	1.633 [1.36 , 2.04]	1.560 [1.23 , 1.99]	0.555 [0.19 , 1.38]	0.110 [0.01 , 1.46]
$\sigma_e \times 100$	0.071 [0.06 , 0.10]	0.072 [0.06 , 0.09]	0.073 [0.07 , 0.08]	0.166 [0.11 , 0.22]	0.229 [0.18 , 0.27]
$\sigma_i \times 100$	0.558 [0.46 , 0.68]	0.558 [0.46 , 0.73]	0.561 [0.46 , 0.72]	0.560 [0.47 , 0.70]	0.557 [0.52 , 0.61]
$\sigma_g \times 100$	0.179 [0.16 , 0.21]	0.180 [0.16 , 0.22]	0.180 [0.16 , 0.21]	0.175 [0.15 , 0.21]	0.179 [0.16 , 0.19]
γ_x	-	-	0.011 [0.00 , 0.06]	-	0.0008 [0.00 , 0.011]
γ_π	-	-	0.000 [0.00 , 0.02]	-	0.0017 [0.00 , 0.0023]
Log Likelihood	1974.49	1982.60	1983.14	1986.84	1988.17
AIC	-3930.98	-3947.20	-3944.28	-3955.68	-3954.34
LR Statistic (rel. RE)		16.22	17.30	24.70	27.36
LR Statistic (rel. FB)			1.08		2.66

Notes: ML estimates for the Ireland model under the five different assumptions for expectations. 95% confidence intervals for the estimates are shown in brackets below the point estimates. The forecasting function in the FB cases and the initial beliefs in the CGL cases are set to the RE solution implied by the estimates in the first column. LR refers to the likelihood ratio.

4.1 In-sample fit comparison

Table 2 shows the estimation results for the five different model specifications. The parameter estimates mostly reflect the three stylized facts. The four bounded rationality strategies each improve the in-sample fit with respect to RE, the parameter estimates are fairly similar across the different specifications with a few exceptions, and the gains are estimated to be small. There is more movement in parameter estimates here than is observed in the examples discussed in Section 1, but the confidence intervals for θ_x , θ_π , ω , ρ_a , and ρ_e all nearly overlap and of course these estimates do not rely on priors.¹²

Within the EE specifications, we observe no significant difference between the FB and CGL cases. Both result in nearly identical parameter estimates and fit the data more or

¹²The likelihood surface is very flat for θ_π in the EE specification moving towards the boundary of the Taylor principle constraint. In monte carlo simulations, there is a pile-up problem in both the EE and IH specifications, where a small percentage of estimates end up on this boundary despite the true value being well away. We have not investigated whether this is a feature of other New Keynesian models estimated under learning.

less equally well. A similar result is obtained for the IH specifications. Although, the improvement in fit between FB and CGL is more than twice as large as that observed for the EE case. In addition, the overall fit of the IH version of the model is significantly better than both EE specifications.

The relatively small and insignificant improvements in-sample fit between the FB and CGL cases demonstrate that the introduction of time-varying parameters does not account for the majority of improvement in the in-sample fit of the model. Most of the increase in fit in both cases is obtained when the estimation of the structural parameters are separated from beliefs (the FB cases), which allows the model to more flexibly fit the data.

Table 3 quantifies the increased flexibility of the model under FB and CGL by reporting the elements of $\mathbf{\Omega}$ for each case (for CGL we show the values implied at the initial belief) at their estimated values reported in Table 2 and the values of θ_π , θ_x , ρ_a , and ρ_e that would imply the same reduced form under RE.¹³ Consistent with the numerical exploration in Section 3.2, the EE-FB and EE-CGL cases generate a modest loosening of the cross-equation restrictions. The reduced form $\mathbf{\Omega}$ is modestly different from the values estimated under RE. While the implied RE parameters that reproduce the same $\mathbf{\Omega}$ remain within the feasible parameter space and even lie within the confidence intervals of the RE estimates. The IH-FB and IH-CGL cases, on the other hand, imply drastically different reduced forms from RE and the EE specifications. To reproduce the same $\mathbf{\Omega}$ under RE requires parameter values that are infeasible and which would imply explosive dynamics.

To further the point, we can quantify the severity of these restrictions by directly estimating $\mathbf{\Omega}$ along with the full complement of the other parameters.¹⁴ This represents the fully unrestricted case. We obtain a log likelihood value of 1,991 and

$$\hat{\mathbf{\Omega}} = \begin{pmatrix} -0.910 & 2.131 \\ -0.008 & -1.441 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (40)$$

Therefore, even the IH case remains somewhat restricted.¹⁵ However, it is the only case

¹³Because we calibrate $\bar{\pi}$, the implied values of \mathbf{C} are roughly equivalent across the five cases and not shown here.

¹⁴For this exercise, we do not impose any structure on $\mathbf{\Omega}$ and allow its four elements to be freely estimated along with the other parameters. \mathbf{C} retains the same restrictions as those imposed under RE. The remaining parameter estimates are almost identical to those obtained under IH-FB in this case with the exception of θ_π . Its value falls to $\theta_\pi = 1.01$.

¹⁵Although, IH dominates the unrestricted case in terms of AIC because of there are four extra parameters in this case.

Table 3: Implied reduced form estimates of Ω

	Ω^{11}	Ω^{21}	Ω^{12}	Ω^{22}	$\Theta^{RE} = (\theta_x, \theta_\pi, \rho_a, \rho_e)'$
RE	0.060	0.083	8.899	-2.901	[1.577, 0.166, 0.933, 0.967]
EE-FB	0.091	0.085	7.272	-2.921	[1.735, 0.242, 0.897, 0.911]
EE-CGL	0.091	0.085	7.126	-2.881	[1.736, 0.241, 0.897, 0.905]
IH-FB	-0.858	0.023	2.367	-1.355	[15.625, 8.132, 4.754, 0.439]
IH-CGL	-3.251	0.081	1.840	-0.937	[12.578, 5.469, 5.039, 0.130]

Notes: Reduced form values implied by the estimated parameters given in Table 2. The final column replicates the exercise conducted in Section 3.2 and shows the value of the RE structural parameters, which would be consistent with the same reduced form values.

that can come close to capturing the unconstrained values.

4.2 Out-of-sample fit

Next, we compare the different models' real-time out-of-sample forecast accuracy for the four observable variables to see whether improved in-sample fit translates into actual forecasting power. We conduct a recursive real-time forecasting exercise, where we use multiple vintages of data to simulate the information set that would have been available to a forecaster at each point in time. We use the real-time dataset provided by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve for real-time data on GDP Deflator, GDP growth, and the three-month Treasury bill. For a real-time measure of the output gap, we use the Fed's Green Book nowcast, which we assume that agents observe with a one-quarter lag.

Our full sample period runs 1984q1 - 2010q1. We construct forecast recursively starting in 1991q1 and ending 2008q3 at four different horizons: the nowcast, one quarter ahead, four quarters ahead, and six quarters ahead. The nowcast is included because in real-time, GDP growth and the GDP Deflator measure of inflation are observed with a one-quarter lag.¹⁶ We also extract from the models a real-time estimates of inflation expectations.

To evaluate forecast accuracy, we compare the inflation and GDP forecasts to the second release values available in the real-time data set. For the output gap, we use the most recent vintage of the CBO measure of the variable. And for the inflation expectations, we use the SPF mean nowcast of GDP Deflator inflation for one-step-ahead expectations and the two-year ahead forecast of the same variable for long run inflation expectations. Inference on improvements in forecast accuracy are obtained using the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test statistic (DM) with the Harvey et al. (1997) small

¹⁶Since the interest rate is observed contemporaneously, we do not report a nowcast for this variable.

sample and forecast horizon correction.¹⁷

Table 4 shows the out-of-sample results for the five cases plus results from a random walk forecast for each variable. The random walk forecasts are included to show how well the models do in absolute terms. The top row for each variable gives the root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE) of the RE forecasts at the four different horizons. The remaining rows give the relative RMSFE of the forecasts compared to RE with the DM test statistic in parentheses below. Values below one represent an improvement in forecast accuracy relative to the RE forecast. The EE-FB and EE-CGL forecasts show significantly greater accuracy with forecasting interest rates at all horizons relative to RE, marginal improvements for forecasting inflation, and little to no improvements for forecasting real variables. We find that there is also almost no difference in forecast accuracy between the EE-FB and EE-CGL cases. Therefore, the forecasting results mirror the in-sample results. Moving from RE to an EE specification generates some improvements in fit. However, the majority of the improvements are generated by the EE-FB case. The addition of learning adds little in the way of forecasting power.

The IH-FB and IH-CGL forecasts show significant increases in forecast accuracy relative to RE for nominal variables and no improvement in real variables. The IH-FB and IH-CGL cases also perform roughly equally well across all variables and horizons. Learning does not appear to materially add to the forecasting power over and above what occurs in the FB case. The IH cases, however, do on average forecast qualitatively better than the EE specifications, which indicates that the observed improvement in the in-sample fit does somewhat translate into out-of-sample forecasting power.

Comparing the model to the random walk forecast, all of the considered specifications do surprisingly well. The four boundedly rational cases perform on average no worse than the random walk in most cases. This finding is somewhat at odds with the DSGE forecasting literature, which finds that medium and large-scale models typically do not perform well versus simple time series models. But, it is consistent with the common finding that parsimonious models, like the ones studied here, often forecasts better than larger models.

Figure 4 shows the real-time inflation expectation estimates versus the SPF, while Table 5 reports the RMSFE comparison. The difference in the short run expectations among RE and FB is driven by different inference of the shocks. In addition, the steady state of inflation is calibrated so that the long run inflation expectation under RE and FB is by construction the same. Keeping with theory, we find that the EE specifications

¹⁷This test statistic is found to work well on tests of real-time forecasts by [Clark and McCracken \(2009\)](#) and [Clark and McCracken \(2011\)](#).

Table 4: Real-time forecast results

Inflation					GDP				
Annualized RMSFE					Annualized RMSFE				
	t (Nowcast)	t+1	t+4	t+6		t (Nowcast)	t+1	t+4	t+6
RE	1.09	1.01	1.08	0.95	RE	2.33	2.18	2.07	1.69
RMSFE Relative to RE					RMSFE Relative to RE				
RW	1.04 (3.29)	0.84** (-1.99)	0.91 (-1.07)	1.05 (0.62)	RW	0.98 (-0.20)	1.00 (-0.01)	1.16 (1.72)	1.30 (2.87)
EE-FB	0.98** (-1.90)	0.97 (-1.15)	0.98* (-1.32)	0.97 (-1.05)	EE-FB	1.13 (0.96)	1.01 (0.16)	0.99 (-0.31)	0.99 (-0.54)
IH-FB	0.92*** (-3.20)	0.85*** (-2.98)	0.88*** (-2.44)	0.84*** (-2.70)	IH-FB	1.07 (0.75)	0.99 (-0.27)	1.02 (0.87)	1.03 (1.29)
EE-CGL	1.00 (-0.26)	0.98 (-0.75)	1.03 (1.36)	1.04 (1.17)	EE-CGL	1.03 (0.36)	0.98 (-0.48)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.22)
IH-CGL	0.93*** (-2.58)	0.88*** (-2.88)	0.92** (-1.82)	0.89** (-1.94)	IH-CGL	1.09 (0.83)	0.99 (-0.20)	1.01 (0.49)	1.02 (0.76)
Interest Rates					Output Gap				
Annualized RMSFE					Annualized RMSFE				
RE	-	1.64	1.88	2.09	RE	1.42	1.56	2.20	2.48
RMSFE Relative to RE					RMSFE Relative to RE				
RW	-	0.28*** (-4.75)	0.81** (-1.76)	0.97 (-0.30)	RW	1.03 (4.16)	1.05 (3.51)	1.06 (4.66)	1.08 (4.31)
EE-FB	-	0.81*** (-3.30)	0.89*** (-2.18)	0.93** (-1.73)	EE-FB	1.09 (2.63)	1.05 (1.61)	1.00 (-0.03)	0.99 (-0.70)
IH-FB	-	0.70*** (-4.11)	0.83*** (-2.42)	0.91* (-1.37)	IH-FB	1.08 (2.48)	1.05 (1.64)	1.02 (1.02)	1.02 (1.38)
EE-CGL	-	0.83*** (-3.01)	0.89*** (-2.21)	0.94* (-1.52)	EE-CGL	1.03 (1.08)	0.97 (-1.25)	0.95*** (-2.56)	0.95*** (-3.33)
IH-CGL	-	0.73*** (-3.96)	0.83*** (-2.47)	0.90** (-1.70)	IH-CGL	1.08 (2.27)	1.05 (1.36)	1.01 (0.51)	1.01 (0.32)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Notes: Diebold and Mariano test statistics are reported in parenthesis. We only place asterisks on cases where a significant improvement is obtained.

Table 5: Inflation Expectations vs SPF

	RE	Relative to RE			
	RMSFE	EE-FB	IH-FB	EE-CGL	IH-CGL
SR	0.802	0.960*** (-1.849)	1.231 (2.893)	0.834*** (-4.316)	1.327 (3.364)
LR	0.638	1.000 -	1.000 -	1.004 (0.497)	0.986** (-1.680)
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$					

Notes: Diebold and Mariano test statistics are reported in parenthesis. We only place asterisks on the cases where significant improvements are obtained.

produce short run expectations that more closely approximate the SPF, while the IH specification produces better long run expectations. Although, neither model produces compelling estimates that should be taken too seriously.

The EE-CGL model produces significantly better inflation expectations estimates than EE-FB, however, this is completely driven by a persistent level shift in the EE-CGL estimates. The EE-FB and EE-CGL inflation expectations actually have a correlation of 0.97, which suggests that it is a low-frequency drift that is driving fit. The correlation between IH-FB and IH-CGL is 0.89 and the correlation between EE-CGL and IH-CGL is 0.71. Overall, none of the short run inflation expectations estimates have a correlation exceeding 0.55 with the mean SPF forecast.


The caveat, of course, is that by design we have fixed initial beliefs to their REE values. If we did not impose this restriction, both EE and IH specifications ability to match inflation expectations greatly improves as documented by [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012a\)](#) and [Cole and Milani \(2017\)](#). The improvement though mostly comes from matching the persistent differences between survey expectations and the actual data, which again highlight CGL's ability to capture long run dynamics as opposed to short-run business cycle dynamics.

4.3 Impulse responses

We now turn to exploring the persistence implied by the five models directly. Figure 5, 6, and 7 show the estimated impulse responses for the monetary policy ($\epsilon_{i,t}$), the preference ($\epsilon_{a,t}$), and the cost push ($\epsilon_{c,t}$) shocks, respectively. We set the size of the shock to the RE estimated values for one standard deviation.


The monetary policy shock provides the clearest picture of the role that CGL can

Figure 4: Inflation Expectations vs SPF



Notes: Comparison of the real-time model implied inflation expectations at a short and long horizon compared to the SPF.

Figure 5: Monetary policy shock



Notes: The shock is same for all models. The shock size is set to one standard deviation using the RE estimate for that value reported in Table 2.


plays in adding persistence. There is no exogenous persistence for the monetary policy shocks in this model. Any persistence from a monetary policy shock must be generated through expectations. Therefore, the RE and FB cases, by construction, can only respond in the period the shock is realized. In Figure 5, we see that the shock is propagated to a degree by both EE-CGL and IH-CGL. The propagation is much greater in the IH case and even delivers a hump shaped response. The duration, however, goes far beyond typical business cycle frequencies with the shock generating effects that last roughly 25 years.

Figure 6 shows the impulse response for the preference shocks. The EE-FB and EE-CGL impulse responses are identical in this case. Learning does not appear to add any persistence. In contrast, the IH-FB and IH-CGL response are quite different. The IH-FB response is similar to EE and RE cases, while IH-CGL exhibits extreme persistence.

Figure 7 shows the cost-push shock. There is little difference between FB and CGL for either EE or IH specifications. Beliefs do not move much in response to cost-push shocks under either specification.

The net takeaway from the impulse responses is that CGL does not add much, if any, persistence in the EE specification. Only the IH specification implies any additional persistence of shocks through expectations. However, the persistence is beyond what most modelers intend to capture with respect to the duration of shocks over the business

Figure 6: Preference shock



Notes: The shock is same for all models. The shock size is set to one standard deviation using the RE estimate for that value reported in Table 2.


cycle.

4.4 Model moments

Finally, we compare the estimated models' implied standard deviations and autocorrelation for the four observable endogenous variables to one another and to the actual data. Table 6 reports the actual and estimated model implied standard deviations for the output gap, inflation, the three-month treasury bill rate, and real GDP growth, which are expressed in annualized terms. The four bounded rationality strategies all imply variances that are qualitatively closer to the actual data than RE. The estimated RE model predicts too much volatility in each variable. The majority of the improvements here, though, occur in the FB cases and then carry over into the CGL cases. Therefore, once again, it appears that loosening the cross-equation restrictions brings the model closer to the data, while learning adds only marginal improvements.

Figure 8 shows the autocorrelation functions implied by the estimated models compared to the actual data. Overall, the FB and CGL cases capture a wider range of correlations than the RE model is capable of, which is more in-line with the data. However, none of the models is able to fully approximate the autocorrelation present in the data.

Figure 7: Cost-push shock




Notes: The shock is same for all models. The shock size is set to one standard deviation using the RE estimate for that value reported in Table 2.

Table 6: Actual and estimated model implied standard deviation of observable variables

Source	Output Gap	Inflation	Interest Rates	GDP Growth
Data	1.40	0.97	2.13	2.04
RE	2.63	3.68	4.79	4.14
EE-FB	1.48	2.58	2.93	3.92
EE-CGL	1.17	2.94	3.64	3.63
IH-FB	2.23	1.26	2.66	4.08
IH-CGL	0.93	1.66	2.94	4.26

Notes: Actual and estimated model implied standard deviations for the four observable data series used in estimation. The results reflect the estimated values provided in Table 2.

Figure 8: Autocorrelation functions



Notes: Actual and estimated model implied autocorrelation functions. The figures reflect the estimated values reported in Table 2.

As in previous comparisons along the other dimensions, the EE-FB and EE-CGL models predict nearly identical autocorrelations functions across the four variables. This indicates that learning does not add much above the loosening of restriction that is shared with the fixed belief case. But, there are significant differences between the IH-FB and the IH-CGL specifications. These cases predict fairly distinct autocorrelation functions despite having nearly identical parameterizations, which indicates that learning is playing a role in generating different dynamics in the simulated data.

4.5 Discussion

The common finding across the four considered dimensions is that the FB case moves the model significantly closer to capturing the data relative to RE. The additional assumption of CGL does not add much under the EE specification and makes only a modest contribution under the IH specification. This should be somewhat surprising given the fact that the FB specifications are conditioned on the RE estimates. It is arguably the smallest deviation from rationality that one can consider, yet it provides significant improvements in model fit across a range of dimensions.

We argue that an FB-type case is the appropriate benchmark to assess a bounded rationality expectation assumption. This case allows for the possibility that RE is the correct assumption while imposing different restrictions on the structural parameters. Not all expectations assumption will nest RE as in the cases considered here. But it should be possible to construct specifications that come close to nesting the RE predictions for most models, which would allow a researcher to distinguish which assumptions are supported by the data and which are not.

The fact that IH-CGL model delivers the best all-around performance of any of the specifications considered is a comforting finding for the DSGE research program. Although IH learning is squarely a bounded rationality strategy, it preserves the underlying microeconomic foundations of the model with respect to the agent's decision problem. Therefore, misspecification of how expectations are formed may be the key assumption putting the New Keynesian model at odds with the data, which makes bounded rationality strategies, such as infinite-horizon learning, a promising approach to reconcile these models with the data.¹⁸

¹⁸This conclusion is also supported by recent a DSGE-VAR study of bounded rationality models by [Cole and Milani \(2017\)](#).

5 Stylized facts revisited

In Section 2.2, we showed that any estimated first-order approximated DSGE model allows for similar pathologies as those highlighted in the previous section. However, the extent to which these issue matter will depend on the details of the specific model under consideration. The basic New Keynesian model we study here is at the center of almost all policy-relevant DSGE models. Therefore, it is likely that larger models will inherit these issues.

One way to quickly assess whether RE is a significant source of misspecification is to estimate a Fixed Belief case using the thought experiment we have explored throughout this paper. To illustrate, we explore an EE-FB case in the model of [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#). Recall that the Smets and Wouters model under adaptive learning, detailed in [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012b\)](#), exhibited all three stylized facts. Therefore, we ask to what extent can an EE-FB case generate similar results as EE-CGL.

For this exercise, we use the replication files provided by the *American Economic Review* for [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#), which estimate the model using Bayesian techniques with the software package Dynare. We start by replicating the benchmark case found in Table 1 and Table 1B of Smets and Wouters paper.¹⁹ For the FB case, we construct the fixed belief using the posterior mode estimates from the RE estimation. We then estimate structural parameters of the FB model using the same priors as in the RE case.

Table 7 shows the replication and EE-FB results in the rightmost panel. For ease of comparison to our previous results, we only report a subset of the parameters estimates. The full set of parameters estimates and priors are given in Table 8 in the appendix. The EE-FB case clearly exhibits the same patterns as noted in the parsimonious model studied in Section 4. The parameter estimates are nearly unchanged relative to the RE estimates, yet the marginal likelihood is significantly improved.

To compare EE-FB with [Slobodyan and Wouters \(2012b\)](#), we present their estimation results for two of their reported EE case and their RE results. The first case, MSV-CGL with initial beliefs set to RE, represents an interesting alternative to our EE-FB case to assess the role that learning plays in improving fit. Here, they set the initial beliefs to those implied by RE using the current estimated parameter values. Therefore, in the first period, the model is equivalent to RE solution, where beliefs and structural parameters satisfy to all RE restrictions. After the first period, beliefs are allowed to drift. They

¹⁹Our results differ slightly from the results reported in [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#) for the RE case. However, since we use their official replications files, we have no reason to doubt that the observed differences are anything more than numerical imprecision, which arises from running the estimation on different versions of Dynare and Matlab.

find that letting these beliefs drift does not add to fit. It is only when initial beliefs are allowed to be materially different from what is implied by the current estimates of the structural parameters that fit is found to improve.

The second MSV-CGL case reported uses optimized initial beliefs, which is a joint estimation of initial beliefs and CGL parameter estimates without imposing that the initial beliefs conform to any RE solution of the model. The estimation is done iteratively with the estimation of structural parameters taking the initial beliefs as given, which like our EE-FB case allows the initial beliefs to differ from the structural parameters at all times. Our EE-FB case produces an improvement in fit relative to RE that explains about a third of the improvement that is obtained under the optimized initial belief case. Although, the optimized initial beliefs are jointly estimated, so the degrees of freedom, in this case, are substantially higher than in the EE-FB case. In addition, the estimated gain remains small. So it is likely that an EE-FB case with optimized beliefs would perform similarly.²⁰ Therefore, it appears that a significant proportion of the improvement in fit in the Smets and Wouters model for MSV learning can also be explained by a relaxation in the cross-equation restrictions imposed by RE.

6 Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that improvements in the in-sample fit of New Keynesian DSGE models under adaptive learning may speak more to the misspecification of the model under RE than to the veracity of the learning assumption that is being considered. In particular, we have shown that both Euler-equation and infinite-horizon learning generate significant improvements in in-sample fit and modest improvements in real-time out-of-sample forecast accuracy compared to RE. However, the actual assumption of learning only appears to meaningfully add to the model's predictions in the infinite-horizon case. The improvements under Euler-equation learning are instead explained by the relaxation of the RE restrictions and do not rely on backward-looking behavior by the agents. We conclude that constant gain learning appears to best capture longer-run movements in data that go beyond typical business cycle frequencies.

Our findings suggest that empirical comparisons between bounded rationality models and RE should be done with care. Significant improvements in model fit relative to RE do not necessarily provide evidence in favor of the alternative strategy since even the most

²⁰There is a discrepancy in the marginal likelihood values, however, since our results match [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#) we believe this is due to numerical issues relating to difference in software versions across both Dynare and Matlab.

Table 7: Stylized facts revisited

	Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b)			Replication	
	RE	MSV-CGL (Init. REE)	MSV-CGL (Opt. Init.)	RE Replication	FB Replication (Init. REE)
Monetary policy and habits					
MP inflation	2.04 [1.75, 2.33]	2.02 [1.74, 2.32]	1.91 [1.58, 2.22]	2.05 [1.77, 2.35]	1.74 [1.41, 2.07]
MP output	0.09 [0.05, 0.13]	0.08 [0.05, 0.12]	0.13 [0.07, 0.18]	0.09 [0.05, 0.13]	0.11 [0.05, 0.17]
MP output growth	0.22 [0.18, 0.27]	0.22 [0.017, 0.26]	0.19 [0.15, 0.24]	0.22 [0.17, 0.26]	0.19 [0.15, 0.23]
MP smoothing	0.81 [0.77, 0.85]	0.81 [0.77, 0.85]	0.84 [0.80, 0.88]	0.82 [0.78, 0.86]	0.88 [0.84, 0.92]
Habits	0.71 [0.64, 0.78]	0.72 [0.65, 0.79]	0.80 [0.75, 0.84]	0.71 [0.64, 0.79]	0.70 [0.58, 0.83]
AR parameters					
Productivity	0.96 [0.94, 0.98]	0.96 [0.94, 0.98]	0.96 [0.94, 0.99]	0.96 [0.94, 0.97]	0.96 [0.93, 0.99]
Risk premium	0.22 [0.08, 0.36]	0.23 [0.07, 0.36]	0.23 [0.13, 0.32]	0.20 [0.07, 0.34]	0.21 [0.04, 0.36]
Gov. spending	0.98 [0.96, 0.99]	0.97 [0.96, 0.99]	0.96 [0.96, 0.99]	0.97 [0.95, 0.98]	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]
Investment	0.71 [0.62, 0.81]	0.72 [0.62, 0.82]	0.45 [0.33, 0.56]	0.74 [0.64, 0.84]	0.71 [0.57, 0.87]
MP shock	0.15 [0.04, 0.24]	0.16 [0.05, 0.26]	0.15 [0.05, 0.26]	0.15 [0.04, 0.25]	0.14 [0.04, 0.23]
Price mark-up	0.89 [0.81, 0.97]	0.89 [0.81, 0.97]	0.93 [0.88, 0.97]	0.90 [0.82, 0.98]	0.90 [0.83, 0.97]
Wage mark-up	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.97 [0.95, 0.99]	0.95 [0.92, 0.99]
St. Dev. Shocks					
Productivity	0.46 [0.41, 0.51]	0.45 [0.41, 0.50]	0.47 [0.42, 0.52]	0.43 [0.39, 0.47]	0.44 [0.39, 0.49]
Risk premium	0.24 [0.20, 0.28]	0.24 [0.20, 0.28]	0.25 [0.22, 0.28]	0.24 [0.21, 0.28]	0.26 [0.23, 0.29]
Gov. spending	0.53 [0.48, 0.58]	0.53 [0.48, 0.58]	0.53 [0.48, 0.58]	0.54 [0.49, 0.59]	0.54 [0.49, 0.59]
Investment	0.45 [0.37, 0.53]	0.45 [0.37, 0.53]	0.61 [0.53, 0.68]	0.45 [0.38, 0.53]	0.64 [0.58, 0.70]
MP shock	0.24 [0.22, 0.27]	0.24 [0.22, 0.27]	0.24 [0.21, 0.26]	0.25 [0.22, 0.27]	0.24 [0.21, 0.26]
Price mark-up	0.14 [0.11, 0.17]	0.14 [0.11, 0.17]	0.14 [0.12, 0.16]	0.14 [0.11, 0.17]	0.12 [0.11, 0.14]
Wage mark-up	0.24 [0.21, 0.28]	0.24 [0.20, 0.28]	0.23 [0.20, 0.26]	0.24 [0.20, 0.28]	0.26 [0.24, 0.29]
Gains	-	0.018 [0.001, 0.034]	0.017 [0.006, 0.021]	-	-
Marginal Likelihood	-922.8	-922.6	-911.0	-924.8	-920.3

Notes: This table reports the estimated values reported by Slobodyan and Wouters (2012b) compared with a replication of their results under RE and FB using the model of Smets and Wouters (2007).

parsimonious deviations from rationality can generate large improvements in fit. On the other hand, the dramatic improvements in the fit that can be obtained by deviating from rationality strongly support considering such approaches in empirical DSGE work. The underlying economic decisions that are captured by the DSGE framework remain perfectly intact within the infinite-horizon specification and we find that it fits the data best. Therefore, bounded rationality remains a promising way to reconcile DSGE models with data but should be approached cautiously.

Appendix A: The model

We describe the model and derive the households' and firms' decision rules following [Preston \(2005\)](#) that depend on expectations but not specifically on any explicit assumption for how expectations are formed. This gives us a general setting from which the consequences of different expectation assumption on the reduced form may be tracked systematically.

Households seek to maximize the following expected utility function

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [a_t \ln(C_{i,t}) + \ln(M_{i,t}/P_t) - \eta^{-1} h_{i,t}^{\eta}] \quad (\text{A1})$$

by choosing consumption, money holdings, labor supply, and by taking into account a preference shock a_t , where $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t$ represents a general expectations operator that is yet to be defined.²¹ The representative household is faced with the budget constraint

$$M_{i,t-1} + B_{i,t-1} + T_t + W_t h_{i,t} + \Delta_{i,t} \geq P_t C_{i,t} + B_{i,t}/r_t + M_t, \quad (\text{A2})$$

where M is nominal money balances, B is nominal bond, T is transfers, W is the nominal wage, and Δ is nominal profits the household receives from ownership of firms.

Production in the economy is separated into two sectors: a perfectly competitive finished goods sector and a monopolistically competitive intermediates goods sector. The finished goods sector uses a continuum of intermediates goods of prices P_j to construct the finished good. The production function is a CES constant returns to scale technology

$$\left(\int_0^1 Y_{j,t}^{(\theta_t-1)/\theta_t} dj \right)^{\theta_t/(\theta_t-1)} \geq Y_t, \quad (\text{A3})$$

where θ_t is a cost push shock.²² The finished-good-producing firms maximize profits

²¹It is assumed that $0 < \beta < 1$, $\eta \geq 1$, and $\ln(a_t) = \rho_a \ln(a_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{a,t}$.

²² $\theta_t = (1 - \rho_{\theta}) \ln(\theta) + \rho_{\theta} \ln(\theta_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{\theta}(t)$.

subject to demand for their good

$$Y_{j,t} = (P_{j,t}/P_t)^{-\theta_t} Y_t. \quad (\text{A4})$$

The finished good price is given by

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_{j,t}^{1-\theta_t} dj \right)^{1/(1-\theta_t)} \quad (\text{A5})$$

for all t . The intermediate-goods-producing firms hire $h_{j,t}$ units of labor to manufacture $Y_{j,t}$ units of outputs using

$$Z_t h_{j,t} \geq Y_{j,t}, \quad (\text{A6})$$

where Z_t is an aggregate technology shock.²³ To introduce price stickiness, it is assumed that firms face an explicit cost to adjust nominal prices following Rotemberg (1982) that is measured in terms of finished goods

$$\frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t. \quad (\text{A7})$$

Lastly, the output gap is defined as the ratio between the actual and efficient levels of output

$$x_t = \left(\frac{1}{a_t} \right)^{1/\eta} \frac{Y_t}{Z_t}. \quad (\text{A8})$$

Household decision rule

The first order conditions of the household's optimal decision are given by

$$a_t C_{i,t}^{-1} = \beta r_t \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} a_{t+1} C_{i,t+1}^{-1} \pi_{t+1}^- \quad (\text{A9})$$

$$h_{i,t}^{\eta-1} = a_t C_{i,t}^{-1} W_t P_t^{-1} \quad (\text{A10})$$

$$B_{i,t-1} + W_t h_{i,t} + \Delta_{i,t} = P_t C_{i,t} + B_t r_t^{-1}, \quad (\text{A11})$$

where we have eliminate the variables dealing with money and transfers in the budget constraint. Starting with budget constraint, we put it into real terms by dividing by the price level²⁴ and make it stationary using substitution to account for the unit root TFP

²³ $\ln(Z_t) = \ln(z) + \ln(Z_{t-1}) + \epsilon_{z,t}$.

²⁴We assume $w_t = W_t/P_t$, $D_t = \Delta_t/P_t$, $b_t = B_t/P_t$.

process Z_t ²⁵

$$b_{i,t-1}\pi_t^{-1} + \omega_t Z_t h_{i,t} + d_{i,t} Z_t = c_{i,t} Z_t + b_{i,t} r_t^{-1}.$$

Then, rearranging and summing, we obtain the lifetime budget constraint

$$\sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} c_{i,T} Z_t = \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} (w_T Z_T h_{i,T} + d_{i,T} Z_t),$$

which allows us to divide out Z_t . Then noting that $w_T h_{i,T} + d_{i,T} = y_{i,T}$, we have

$$\sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \hat{c}_{i,T} = \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \hat{y}_{i,t}. \quad (\text{A12})$$

We then log-linearize the stationary Euler-equation

$$\hat{c}_{i,t} = \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \hat{c}_{i,t+1} - (i_t - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}) + (\rho_a - 1) \hat{a}_t$$

and solve it backwards recursively to get

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \hat{c}_{i,T+1} = \hat{c}_{i,t} + \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \sum_{s=t}^T ((i_s - \hat{\pi}_{s+1}) - (\rho_a - 1) \hat{a}_t).$$

Then summing and discounting this expectation we get

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} \hat{c}_{i,T+1} = \frac{1}{1-\beta} \hat{c}_{i,t} + \frac{1}{1-\beta} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} ((i_T - \hat{\pi}_{T+1}) - (\rho_a - 1) \hat{a}_T). \quad (\text{A13})$$

Combining Equation (A12) and (A13) yields the household's decision rule for consumption

$$\hat{c}_{i,t} = \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{i,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} [(1-\beta) y_{j,T+1} - (i_T - \hat{\pi}_{T+1}) - (\rho_a - 1) \hat{a}_T].$$

Aggregating across households and using the log-linearized output gap, we obtain the aggregate IS curve

$$x_t = -\omega \hat{a}_t + \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t} [(1-\beta)(x_{T+1} + \omega \rho_a \hat{a}_T) - (i_T - \hat{\pi}_{T+1}) - (\rho_a - 1) \hat{a}_T], \quad (\text{A14})$$

²⁵We assume $\omega_t = W_t/(P_t Z_t)$, $d_t = \Delta_t/(P_t Z_t)$.

which is absent any assumption about how expectations are formed.

Firm decision rule

Firms maximize the present value of their companies

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{j,t} \sum_{T=t} Q_{t,T} P_T \Pi_{j,T}, \quad (\text{A15})$$

where

$$\Pi_{j,T} = \left(\frac{P_{j,T}}{P_T} - \frac{MC_{j,T}}{P_T} \right) Y_{j,t} - \frac{\Phi}{2} \left(\frac{P_{j,T}}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,T-1}} - 1 \right)^2 Y_t \quad (\text{A16})$$

and $Q_{t,T} = \beta^{T-t} \frac{a_T}{c_T}$. The first order condition of the firm's problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi \left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{1}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,t-1}} &= \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{j,t} \left[\frac{Q_{t,t+1} Y_{t+1}}{Q_{t,t} Y_t} \Phi \left(\frac{P_{j,t+1}}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,t}} - 1 \right) \frac{P_{j,t+1}}{\bar{\pi} P_{j,t}^2} \right] \\ &+ \theta_t \left(\frac{P_{j,t}}{P_t} \right)^{-1-\theta_t} \left(\frac{w_t \theta_t - Z_t (\theta_t - 1) P_{j,t}}{P_t^2 Z_t} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A17})$$

Because we assume $\bar{\pi} \geq 1$, the model does not have a steady state price level. Therefore, to make the model stationary, we define: $\hat{P}_{j,t+i} = P_{j,t+i}/P_{t+i}$ and $\pi_{t+i} = P_{t+i}/P_{t+i-1}$ for all i . Likewise, wages are made stationary by the following substitution $\omega_t = w_t/P_t Z_t$. Substituting in these definitions yields

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi \left(\frac{\hat{P}_{j,t} P_t}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t-1} P_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{1}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t-1} P_{t-1}} &= \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{j,t} \left[\frac{Q_{t,t+1} Y_{t+1}}{Q_{t,t} Y_t} \Phi \left(\frac{\hat{P}_{j,t+1} P_{t+1}}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t} P_t} - 1 \right) \frac{\hat{P}_{j,t+1} P_{t+1}}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t}^2 P_t^2} \right] \\ &+ \left(\hat{P}_{j,t} \right)^{-\theta_t} \left(\theta_t \omega_t + (1 - \theta_t) \hat{P}_{j,t} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Now, noting that market clearing implies $C_t = Y_t$, multiplying both sides by P_t , and using the definition of inflation we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi \left(\frac{\hat{P}_{j,t} \Pi_t}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{\Pi_t}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t-1}} &= \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_{j,t} \left[\frac{a_{t+1}}{a_t} \Phi \left(\frac{\hat{P}_{j,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t}} - 1 \right) \frac{\hat{P}_{j,t+1} \Pi_{t+1}}{\bar{\pi} \hat{P}_{j,t}^2} \right] \\ &+ \left(\hat{P}_{j,t} \right)^{-\theta_t} \left(\theta_t \omega_t + (1 - \theta_t) \hat{P}_{j,t} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Log-linearizing this expression

$$-\Phi p_{j,t-1} + (\Phi(\beta+1) - 1 + \bar{\theta})p_{j,t} - \Phi\beta\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t}p_{j,t+1} = \Phi\beta\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t}\pi_{t+1} - \Phi\pi_t - \hat{\omega}_t(1 - \bar{\theta}) - \hat{\theta}_t \quad (\text{A18})$$

and introducing lag polynomials, we can write this as

$$\left(\frac{1}{\beta}L^2 - \frac{\Phi(\beta+1) - 1 + \bar{\theta}}{\Phi\beta}L + 1\right)\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t}p_{j,t+1} = \frac{1}{\beta}(\pi_t - \beta E_t\pi_{t+1}) + \frac{1 - \bar{\theta}}{\beta\Phi}\hat{\omega}_t + \frac{1}{\Phi\beta}\hat{\theta}_t. \quad (\text{A19})$$

Factoring the lag polynomial and solving forward the unstable root yields

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - \lambda_1 L)p_{j,t} &= \frac{-\lambda_2^{-1}L^{-1}}{1 - \lambda_2^{-1}L^{-1}} \frac{L}{\beta} \left(\pi_t - \beta E_t\pi_{t+1} + \frac{1 - \bar{\theta}}{\Phi}\hat{\omega}_t + \frac{1}{\Phi}e_t \right) \\ &= -\lambda_1\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1\beta)^{T-t}\pi_T + \lambda_1\beta\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1\beta)^{T-t}\pi_{T+1} \\ &\quad + \tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \beta^{T-t}(\psi x_T - e_T). \end{aligned}$$

where $(\bar{\theta} - 1)\eta\Phi^{-1}\omega_t = \psi x_t$, $\Phi^{-1}\hat{\theta}_t = e_t$, $0 < \lambda_1 < 1$, $\lambda_2 > 1$, $\lambda_2 = \frac{1}{\lambda_1\beta}$, and $\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 = (\Phi\beta)^{-1}(\Phi(\beta+1) - 1 + \bar{\theta})$. Combining terms we have²⁶

$$(1 - \lambda_1 L)p_{j,t} = -\pi_t + \lambda_1\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_{j,t} \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1\beta)^{T-t} \frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1} \pi_T + \psi x_T - e_T.$$

Finally, aggregating across firms yields the aggregate Phillips curve, which is free of any expectations assumptions

$$\pi_t = \lambda_1\tilde{\mathbb{I}}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_1\beta)^{T-t} \left(\frac{1 - \lambda_1}{\lambda_1} \pi_T + \psi x_T - e_T \right). \quad (\text{A20})$$

Monetary policy

The model is closed with a standard contemporaneous Taylor rule

$$i_t = \bar{r} + \bar{\pi} + \theta_\pi(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) + \theta_x x_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (\text{A21})$$

²⁶noting that $-\lambda_1\pi_t - \lambda_1^2\beta\pi_{t+1} - \lambda_1^3\beta^2\pi_{t+2}\dots$ and $\lambda_1\beta\pi_{t+1} + (\lambda_1\beta)^2\pi_{t+2} + (\lambda_1\beta)^3\pi_{t+3}\dots$ and $-\lambda_1\pi_t + \lambda_1\beta(1 - \lambda_1)\pi_{t+1} + (\lambda_1\beta)^2(1 - \lambda_1)\pi_{t+2} + (\lambda_1\beta)^3(1 - \lambda_1)\pi_{t+3}\dots$

where $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.

Appendix B: Smets and Wouters replication

Table 8: Smets and Wouters' Model

	RE					FB							
	Prior Mean	Post. Mean	90% HPD Interval		Prior	P. St. Dev	Prior Mean	Post. Mean	90% HPD Interval		Prior	P. St. Dev	
ρ_a (ρ_z)	0.5	0.955	0.936	0.974	beta	0.2	ρ_a (ρ_z)	0.5	0.956	0.927	0.986	beta	0.2
ρ_b (ρ_a)	0.5	0.204	0.070	0.337	beta	0.2	ρ_b (ρ_a)	0.5	0.205	0.036	0.358	beta	0.2
ρ_g	0.5	0.966	0.951	0.981	beta	0.2	ρ_g	0.5	0.967	0.946	0.989	beta	0.2
ρ_l	0.5	0.742	0.642	0.844	beta	0.2	ρ_l	0.5	0.714	0.565	0.863	beta	0.2
ρ_r (ρ_i)	0.5	0.148	0.044	0.249	beta	0.2	ρ_r (ρ_i)	0.5	0.141	0.041	0.234	beta	0.2
ρ_p (ρ_e)	0.5	0.895	0.817	0.977	beta	0.2	ρ_p (ρ_e)	0.5	0.897	0.829	0.968	beta	0.2
ρ_w	0.5	0.968	0.948	0.988	beta	0.2	ρ_w	0.5	0.950	0.915	0.987	beta	0.2
μ_p	0.5	0.715	0.547	0.882	beta	0.2	μ_p	0.5	0.699	0.605	0.791	beta	0.2
μ_w	0.5	0.830	0.728	0.938	beta	0.2	μ_w	0.5	0.829	0.769	0.890	beta	0.2
ϕ	4	5.382	3.688	7.102	norm	1.5	ϕ	4	4.657	3.147	6.113	norm	1.5
σ_c	1.5	1.381	1.163	1.593	norm	0.375	σ_c	1.5	1.006	0.421	1.561	norm	0.375
h	0.7	0.713	0.643	0.788	beta	0.1	h	0.7	0.704	0.579	0.833	beta	0.1
ξ_w	0.5	0.687	0.577	0.803	beta	0.1	ξ_w	0.5	0.684	0.590	0.778	beta	0.1
σ_l	2	1.532	0.598	2.457	norm	0.75	σ_l	2	1.887	0.829	2.894	norm	0.75
ξ_p	0.5	0.652	0.555	0.745	beta	0.1	ξ_p	0.5	0.596	0.500	0.682	beta	0.1
ι_w	0.5	0.568	0.358	0.774	beta	0.15	ι_w	0.5	0.601	0.391	0.817	beta	0.15
ι_p	0.5	0.241	0.096	0.382	beta	0.15	ι_p	0.5	0.384	0.192	0.589	beta	0.15
ψ	0.5	0.476	0.306	0.648	beta	0.15	ψ	0.5	0.418	0.219	0.612	beta	0.15
Ψ	1.25	1.703	1.577	1.825	norm	0.125	Ψ	1.25	1.652	1.530	1.775	norm	0.125
r_π (θ_π)	1.5	2.054	1.765	2.354	norm	0.25	r_π (θ_π)	1.5	1.740	1.406	2.071	norm	0.25
ρ	0.75	0.817	0.776	0.857	beta	0.1	ρ	0.75	0.880	0.843	0.918	beta	0.1
r_y (θ_x)	0.125	0.090	0.051	0.126	norm	0.05	r_y (θ_x)	0.125	0.112	0.053	0.171	norm	0.05
$r_{\Delta\text{tay}}$	0.125	0.217	0.173	0.262	norm	0.05	$r_{\Delta\text{tay}}$	0.125	0.190	0.145	0.234	norm	0.05
$\bar{p}i$	0.625	0.654	0.535	0.770	gamma	0.1	$\bar{p}i$	0.625	0.631	0.497	0.765	gamma	0.1
$100(\beta^{-1} - 1)$	0.25	0.251	0.093	0.407	gamma	0.1	$100(\beta^{-1} - 1)$	0.25	0.252	0.091	0.401	gamma	0.1
\bar{l}	0	0.291	-1.285	1.912	norm	2	\bar{l}	0	-0.066	-1.635	1.518	norm	2
$\tilde{\gamma}$	0.4	0.442	0.415	0.470	norm	0.1	$\tilde{\gamma}$	0.4	0.440	0.413	0.467	norm	0.1
\bar{g}	0.5	0.609	0.454	0.766	norm	0.25	\bar{g}	0.5	0.600	0.442	0.760	norm	0.25
α	0.3	0.292	0.218	0.362	norm	0.05	α	0.3	0.266	0.194	0.335	norm	0.05
σ_a (σ_z)	0.1	0.432	0.386	0.474	invg	2	σ_a (σ_z)	0.1	0.443	0.397	0.488	invg	2
σ_b (σ_a)	0.1	0.242	0.205	0.282	invg	2	σ_b (σ_a)	0.1	0.259	0.232	0.286	invg	2
σ_g	0.1	0.540	0.488	0.590	invg	2	σ_g	0.1	0.538	0.486	0.588	invg	2
σ_l	0.1	0.453	0.375	0.529	invg	2	σ_l	0.1	0.639	0.575	0.703	invg	2
σ_r (σ_i)	0.1	0.246	0.220	0.270	invg	2	σ_r (σ_i)	0.1	0.235	0.212	0.258	invg	2
σ_p (σ_e)	0.1	0.138	0.108	0.166	invg	2	σ_p (σ_e)	0.1	0.123	0.106	0.138	invg	2
σ_w	0.1	0.242	0.204	0.279	invg	2	σ_w	0.1	0.262	0.236	0.287	invg	2

Notes: Prior and posterior distributions for the model of [Smets and Wouters \(2007\)](#) estimated under RE and FB. The main labels correspond to parameters names in Smets and Wouters' paper. The parameters names in parenthesis show the corresponding parameter in the Ireland model.

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